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Abstract—We consider team optimal control of decentralized
systems with linear dynamics and quadratic costs that consist of
multiple sub-populations with exchangeable agents (i.e., exchang-
ing two agents within the same sub-population does not affect the
dynamics or the cost). Such a system is equivalent to one where
the dynamics and costs are coupled across agents through the
mean-field (or empirical mean) of the states and actions. Two
information structures are investigated. In the first, all agents
observe their local state and the mean-field of all sub-populations;
in the second, all agents observe their local state but the mean-
field of only a subset of the sub-populations. Both information
structures are non-classical and not partially nested. Nonetheless,
it is shown that linear control strategies are optimal for the first
and approximately optimal for the second; the approximation
error is inversely proportional to the size of the sub-populations
whose mean-fields are not observed. The corresponding gains are
determined by the solution of K+1 Riccati equations, where K
is the number of sub-populations. The dimensions of the Riccati
equations do not depend on the size of the sub-populations; thus
the solution complexity is independent of the number of agents.
Generalizations to major-minor agents, tracking cost, weighted
mean-field, and infinite horizon are provided. The results are
illustrated using an example of demand response in smart grids.
Index Terms—Exchangeability, decentralized control, mean-
field teams, linear quadratic systems, team theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Team optimal control of decentralized systems has been an
important research topic since the mid 1960s. Many of the
initial research results were negative and showed that even
simple dynamical systems with two agents can be difficult
to design [2], [3]. Since then, various solution methodologies
for the optimal control of decentralized systems have been
proposed and there has been considerable progress in under-
standing the nature of system dynamics and the information
structure under which these methodologies work. See [4] and
references therein for an overview.
In spite of this progress, there is a big gap between the
theory and applications of optimal decentralized control. On
the one hand, the envisioned applications—which include
networked control systems, swarm robotics, and modern power
J. Arabneydi and A. Mahajan are with the Department of Electrical and
Computer Engineering, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. Email:
j.arabneydi@gmail.com and aditya.mahajan@mcgill.ca.
This research was funded by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research
Council of Canada through Grant NSERC-RGPIN 402753-11.
Preliminary version of this paper [1] was presented at the 54th IEEE
Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), Osaka, Japan, 2015.
systems—often consist of multiple interconnected dynamical
systems and controllers. On the other hand, explicit optimal
solutions are available for systems with only a few (often two
or three) controllers [5]–[7]. The model and results presented
in this paper attempt to reduce the gap between theory and
applications.
In particular, we study decentralized control systems in
which the dynamics and cost satisfy a property that we call
exchangeability. This property is inspired by the concept of
exchangeability in probability theory. A collection of random
variables (x1, . . . , xn) are called exchangeable if, for any
permutation σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) of (1, . . . , n), the probabil-
ity distribution of (xσ1 , . . . , xσn) is the same as that of
(x1, . . . , xn). Or, equivalently, the probability distribution does
not depend on the index assigned to random variables.
In a dynamical system, we say agents i and j are exchange-
able if exchanging (or interchanging) agents i and j does not
affect the dynamics or the cost (the formal definition is given
below). Or, equivalently, the dynamics and the cost do not
depend on the index assigned to the two agents.
In many applications of decentralized systems, the system
may be partitioned into sub-populations where all agents
within a sub-population are exchangeable. For instance, in
demand response in power systems, the system dynamics
and cost would not change if the houses in a residential
neighborhood were numbered differently; in swam robotics,
the dynamics and cost depend on the position of the robots,
not on how we index them. We call such systems as systems
with partially exchangeable agents. In this paper, we develop
a framework for the design of optimal decentralized control
for such systems.
B. System with partially exchangeable agents
To formally define exchangeability, consider a multi-agent
dynamical system where N denotes the set of agents. The
state and action of agent i, i ∈ N , at time t are denoted by xit
and uit, where x
i
t ∈ X i and uit ∈ U i. Let xt = (xit)i∈N and
ut = (u
i
t)i∈N denote the state and action of the entire system.
The dynamics are given by
xt+1 = ft(xt,ut,wt), (1)
where ft is system dynamics and {wt}t≥1, where wt =
(wit)i∈N and w
i
t ∈ Wi, is the disturbance noise process. A
per-step cost ct(xt,ut) is incurred at each time t.
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2For now, we do not specify the information structure as we
want to identify the system properties that do not depend on
the information structure.
For any state x and agents i, j ∈ N , let σi,jx denote the
state when agents i and j are exchanged. For example, if x =
(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5), then σ2,4x = (x1, x4, x3, x2, x5). Similar
interpretation holds for σi,ju and σi,jw.
Definition 1 (Exchangeable agents) A pair (i, j) of agents
is exchangeable if the following conditions hold:
1) X i = X j , U i = U j , and Wi = Wj , i.e., the states,
actions, and disturbances of agents i and j have the same
dimensions.
2) For any t, and any xt, ut, and wt,
ft(σi,jxt, σi,jut, σi,jwt) = σi,j
(
ft(xt,ut,wt)
)
,
i.e., exchanging agents i and j does not affect the system
dynamics.
3) For any t, and any xt and ut,
ct(σi,jxt, σi,jut) = ct(xt,ut),
i.e., exchanging agents i and j does not affect the cost.
Definition 2 (Exchangeable set of agents) A set S of
agents, S ⊆ N , is exchangeable if every pair of agents in S
is exchangeable.
Definition 3 (System with partially exchangeable agents)
The multi-agent described above is called a system with
partially exchangeable agents if the set N of agents can be
partitioned into K disjoint subsets N k, k ∈ K := {1, . . . ,K},
such that for each k ∈ K, the set N k of agents is
exchangeable.
In this paper, we investigate optimal decentralized control
of linear quadratic system (i.e., a system where dynamics are
linear and the per-step cost is quadratic) with partially ex-
changeable agents. In a subsequent paper, we will investigate
systems with controlled Markovian dynamics.
C. Notation
For a set N , |N | denotes its size. For a matrix A, Aᵀ
denotes its transpose, Tr(A) denotes its trace; if A is square,
A ≥ 0 (respectively A > 0) denotes that A is positive semi-
definite (respectively positive definite). For matrices A and B
of appropriate size, A ≤ B means B − A ≥ 0, diag(A,B)
denotes a block diagonal matrix with diagonal terms A and
B,
√
A denotes B where A = BᵀB, A◦B denotes Hadamard
product, and A ⊗ B denotes Kronecker product. For matrices
A,B, and C with the same number of columns, rows(A,B,C)
denotes the matrix [Aᵀ, Bᵀ, Cᵀ]ᵀ. For vectors x, y, and z,
vec(x, y, z) denotes the vector [xᵀ, yᵀ, zᵀ]ᵀ.
Superscripts index agents (indexed by i) or sub-populations
(indexed by k). Given a set N of agents and states xi, i ∈
N , bold x denotes vec(x1, . . . , x|N |); when all states are
of the same dimension, 〈(xi)i∈N 〉 denotes the mean-field
1
|N |
∑|N |
i=1 x
i of (xi)i∈N . For vectors and matrices, we use
the short hand notation x1:t or A1:t to denote (x1, . . . , xt)
and (A1, . . . , At), respectively.
R, R≥0, and R>0 denote the sets of real, non-negative real,
and positive real numbers, respectively. 1n×m denotes n×m
matrix of ones, In denotes n×n identity matrix. We omit the
subscripts when the dimensions are clear from the context.
For a random variable x, E[x] and var(x) denote its mean
and variance, respectively.
Given horizon T and matrices A1:T and Q1:T , the notation
M1:T = DLET(A1:T , Q1:T ) means that M1:T is the solution
of the finite horizon discrete Lyapunov equation, i.e., MT =
QT , and for t ∈ {T − 1, . . . , 1}, Mt = AtᵀMt+1At +Qt.
Similarly, given a horizon T and matrices A1:T ,
B1:T , Q1:T , and R1:T , the notation M1:T =
DRET(A1:T , B1:T , Q1:T , R1:T ) means that M1:T is
the solution of the finite horizon discrete Riccati
equation, i.e., MT = QT , and for t ∈ {T − 1, . . . , 1},
Mt = −AᵀtMt+1Bt (BᵀtMt+1Bt +Rt)−1BᵀtMt+1At +
AᵀtMt+1At +Qt.
Given a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1] and matrices A,B,Q,
and R, the notation M = DALEβ(A,Q) means that M is the
solution of the discrete algebraic Lyapunov equation
M = βAᵀMA+Q.
and the notation M = DAREβ(A,B,Q,R) means that M is
the solution of the discrete algebraic Riccati equation
M = −βAᵀMB (BᵀMB + β−1R)−1BᵀMA+βAᵀMA+Q.
D. Linear quadratic system with partially exchangeable
agents
1) System Model: Suppose the dynamics (1) are linear, i.e.,
xt+1 = Atxt +Btut + wt, (2)
where At and Bt are matrices of appropriate dimensions
and {x1, {wt}Tt=1} are random variables defined on a com-
mon probability space. The cost is quadratic, i.e., for t ∈
{1, . . . , T − 1},
ct(xt,ut) = xt
ᵀQtxt + utᵀRtut, (3)
and t = T ,
cT (xT ) = xT
ᵀQTxT , (4)
where Qt and Rt are matrices of appropriate dimensions.
Furthermore, assume that the above system is partially ex-
changeable, i.e., agents N can be partitioned into K disjoint
sub-populations N k, k ∈ K := {1, . . . ,K}, such that for each
k ∈ K, the agents N k are exchangeable. Moreover, for any
sub-population k ∈ K and agent i ∈ N k, state xit takes values
in Rdkx and action uit takes values in Rd
k
u .
The mean-field of states1 x¯kt of sub-population k, k ∈ K,
is defined as the empirical mean of the states of all agents in
that sub-population, i.e.,
x¯kt := 〈(xit)i∈Nk〉 =
1
|N k|
∑
i∈Nk
xit, k ∈ K.
1In the sequel, we refer to mean-field of the states simply as mean-field.
3Similarly, the mean-field of the actions u¯kt of sub-population
k, k ∈ K, is defined as the empirical mean of the actions of
all agents in that sub-population, i.e.,
u¯kt := 〈(uit)i∈Nk〉 =
1
|N k|
∑
i∈Nk
uit, k ∈ K.
The mean-field of states and actions of the entire population
are denoted by x¯t and u¯t respectively, i.e.,
x¯t = vec(x¯
1
t , . . . , x¯
K
t ), u¯t = vec(u¯
1
t , . . . , u¯
K
t ).
For ease of reference, the notation is summarized in Table I.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE NOTATION USED IN THIS PAPER.
Notation used for agent i ∈ N k belonging to sub-population k ∈ K
xit ∈ Rd
k
x State of agent i
uit ∈ Rd
k
u Action of agent i
Notation used for sup-population k ∈ K = {1, . . . ,K}
N k Entire sub-population k
x¯kt = 〈(xit)i∈Nk 〉 Mean-field of states at time t
u¯kt = 〈(uit)i∈Nk 〉 Mean-field of actions at time t
Notation used for entire population
N = ⋃k∈KN k Entire population
xt = (xit)i∈N Joint state of entire population at time t
ut = (uit)i∈N Joint action of entire population at time t
x¯t = vec(x¯1t , . . . , x¯
K
t ) Mean-field of states of entire population at t
u¯t = vec(u¯1t , . . . , u¯
K
t ) Mean-field of actions of entire population at t
Proposition 1 In the linear quadratic system with partially
exchangeable agents described above, there exist matri-
ces {Akt , Bkt , Dkt , Ekt , Qkt , Rkt }k∈K and P xt and Put such that
the dynamics of agent i ∈ N k of sub-population k, k ∈ K,
may be written as
xit+1 = A
k
t x
i
t +B
k
t u
i
t +D
k
t x¯t + E
k
t u¯t + w
i
t; (5)
the per-step cost at time t ∈ {1, . . . , T −1}, may be written as
ct(xt,ut, x¯t, u¯t) = x¯
ᵀ
t P
x
t x¯t + u¯
ᵀ
t P
u
t u¯t
+
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
1
|N k|
[
(xit)
ᵀ
Qkt x
i
t + (u
i
t)
ᵀ
Rkt u
i
t
]
; (6)
and the per-step cost at time t = T , may be written as
cT (xT , x¯T ) = x¯
ᵀ
TP
x
T x¯T +
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
1
|N k| (x
i
T )
ᵀ
QkTx
i
T . (7)
The proof is presented in Appendix A.
Thus, any linear quadratic system with partial exchangeable
agents—irrespective of the information structure—is equiva-
lent to a mean-field coupled system with the same information
structure. In the rest of this paper, we investigate the optimal
control of such systems under the following two information
structures.
2) Observation model and information structure: We con-
sider two information structures; in both, agents perfectly
recall all data that they observe. In the first information
structure, which we call mean field sharing and denote by
MFS-IS, every agent i ∈ N perfectly observes its local state
xit and the global mean-field x¯t. Thus, the data I
i
t available
to agent i at time t is given by
Iit = (x
i
1:t, u
i
1:t−1, x¯1:t). (MFS-IS)
In the second information structure, which we call partial
mean field sharing and denote by PMFS-IS, there exists a
subset S of the sub-populations K such that every agent i ∈ N
perfectly observes its local state xit and the mean-fields of sub-
populations S, i.e., {x¯kt }k∈S . We use Sc to denote K\S . The
data Iit available to agent i at time t is given by
Iit = (x
i
1:t, u
i
1:t−1, (x¯
k
1:t)k∈S). (PMFS-IS)
Under both information structures, agent i chooses uit as
follows:
uit = g
i
t(I
i
t). (8)
The function git is called the control law of agent i at time t.
The collection gi = (gi1, g
i
2, . . . , g
i
T ) is called the control
strategy of agent i. The collection g = (gi)i∈N is called the
control strategy of the system. The performance of strategy g
is given by
J(g) = Eg
[ T−1∑
t=1
ct(xt,ut, x¯t, u¯t) + cT (xT , x¯T )
]
, (9)
where the expectation is with respect to the measure induced
on all the system variables by the choice of strategy g.
Remark 1 Note that the mean-field can be shared in a dis-
tributed manner using consensus algorithms [8].
3) The optimization problem: We are interested in the
following optimization problem.
Problem 1 In the model described above, find a strategy g∗
that minimizes (9), i.e.,
J∗ := J(g∗) = inf
g
J(g),
where the infimum is taken over all strategies of form (8).
E. Contributions and Literature overview
Problem 1 is a decentralized linear quadratic system with
a non-classical information structure. In centralized linear
quadratic systems, the optimal control strategy is linear in the
agent’s estimate of the state. The optimal gain is determined
by the solution of backward Riccati equations and the agent’s
estimate is updated using Kalman filtering equations. However,
this is not the case for decentralized systems. As illustrated
by the Witsenhausen counterexample [2], in decentralized
systems non-linear strategies can outperform the best linear
strategy. In general, linear strategies are globally optimal for
only partially nested information structure [9] and its varia-
tions [10]. Even if attention is restricted to linear strategies,
the problem of finding the best linear strategies may not be
4convex; it is convex only for special sparsity patterns such as
funnel causality [11] and quadratic invariance [12].
The mean-field sharing information structure (MFS-IS) is
neither partially nested nor quadratic invariant. Hence, we
cannot assert a priori that linear strategies are globally optimal
or that the problem of finding the best linear strategies is
convex. One of our contributions is to show that the linear
strategies are optimal for MFS-IS.
The corresponding optimal gains are computed by K + 1
decoupled Riccati equations: one for each sub-population and
one for the mean-field term. In fact, for the decentralized
implementation, each agent simply needs to solve two Ric-
cati equations: one corresponding to its own sub-population
and one to the mean-field. The dimensions of these Riccati
equations do not depend on the number of agents in each sub-
population. Thus, the solution complexity does not depend
on the number of agents in the system. In addition, if the
matrices defined in Proposition 1 do not depend on the number
of agents in each sub-population, then neither do the optimal
gains. Consequently, the agents need not even be aware of the
size of each sub-population.
Furthermore, for partial mean field sharing information
structure (PMFS-IS), we propose a linear strategy that is
approximately optimal where the approximation error O(1/n),
n := mink∈Sc |N k|. The proposed strategy is a certainty
equivalence strategy in which all agents generate an estimate
of the unobserved components of the mean-field using the
observed components of the mean field. This estimate is used
in the optimal strategy identified for MFS-IS. We show that the
approximation error between the proposed strategy for PMFS-
IS and the optimal strategy for MFS-IS is given by terms of
the weighted cost of a linear system, which can be computed
by a Lyapunov equation.
In section III, we show that our results generalize to several
variations of the basic mean-field model including: systems
where a major agent interacts with a collection of minor
agents; systems where there is no local control action; systems
where agents have individual tracking cost; systems where
agents have individual weights. In section VI, we show our
results generalize to infinite horizon setup using standard
arguments. In section VII, we illustrate the results using an
example of demand response in smart grids.
Our model and results for MFS-IS are similar in spirit to
those obtained in [13] under stronger modeling assumptions.
In [13], the authors consider a homogeneous population of
dynamically decoupled agents which are coupled in the cost
through a weighted mean-field term. Two models are inves-
tigated: (a) hard-constraint model where the weighted mean-
field of actions must equal a pre-specified linear function of
the weighted mean field of states; and (b) soft-constraint model
where the above hard constraint is relaxed by penalizing it in
the cost. For both models, the authors show that the optimal
centralized control laws are linear in the local state and the
mean field; the corresponding gains are computed by two
decoupled Riccati equations. In section III-D, we generalize
our results to the case when a weighted empirical mean field
is shared. In contrast to [13], we consider heterogeneous
population and allow agents to be coupled in dynamics. Note
that approximation results similar to those for partial mean-
field sharing were not considered in [13].
Our results have similar features to those obtained for
centralized linear quadratic mean-field control [14], [15]. In
these models, the dynamics and the cost depend on the
statistical mean-field of the state and action. Such a model
may be viewed as a special case of our model when we restrict
to a single homogeneous sub-population and consider the limit
of infinite number of agents (and therefore the empirical mean
and the statistical mean are the same). Our proof technique,
which relies on a simple change of variables, is conceptually
simpler than that of [14], [15].2 It is worth highlighting that
the linear quadratic mean-field control model is a centralized
control problem and the results of [14], [15] do not apply to
the multi-agent models that we consider.
Recently, an iterative bidding strategy was proposed in [17]
for the optimal control multi-agent systems with decoupled dy-
namics that are coupled through a constraint. For LQG agents,
the scheme operates as follows: at each time, a coordinator sets
a price profile for all future times; agents submit a bid profile
for all future times; the coordinator updates the prices and
the process continues until the bids have converged. Agents
choose the first value of their bid as their action and the above
process is repeated at the next time step. In this scheme, agents
do not need to know the system dynamics of other agents. In
contrast, we assume that the system dynamics are common
knowledge to all agents. However, in our model, agents only
need to share the mean-field of their states (which can be
computed using a consensus algorithm) rather than iteratively
sharing the bid profile for all future times.
An alternative decomposition-coordination approach for op-
timal decentralized control of deterministic LQ systems was
proposed in [18], [19]. This is an iterative approach. Each
iteration consists of two steps: (i) a decomposition step in
which each agent assumes decoupled dynamics and costs and
computes its local control trajectory by solving an optimal
tracking problem from pre-specified linear offsets for the
dynamics and a reference trajectory for the cost; (ii) a coor-
dination step in which the linear offsets for the dynamics and
reference trajectories for the cost are computed for all agents
from the pre-specified control trajectories. It is shown that this
iterative process converges to the optimal centralized solution.
In contrast to such decomposition-coordination methods, our
proposed solution is not iterative. The optimal gains for all
agents are computed in a single step by solving Riccati
equations. Furthermore, our solution methodology works for
deterministic as well as stochastic systems.
A related solution approach called mean-field games (MFG)
was proposed in [20]–[28] to compute approximate Nash
equilibrium for large population games. The main idea is to
assume an infinite large size of each sub-population and solve
a set of two coupled equations: a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation to compute the best response of a generic
agent playing against a “mass trajectory” and a Fokker-Planck-
2In [14], first coupled forward and backward stochastic differential equa-
tions are derived and then they are decoupled into two Riccati equations using
the four step technique of [16]. In [15], a matrix dynamical optimization
method is used.
5Kolmogorov (FPK) equation to compute the mass trajectory
from the strategy of a generic agent. It is shown that a
solution to these equations exists under appropriate conditions.
The resulting strategies are ε-Nash when the sub-populations
are finite, where the approximation error is O(1/√n), n :=
mink∈K |N k|. For linear quadratic systems, the coupled HJB-
FPK equations simplify to K Riccati equations and two
coupled forward and backward ODEs. In contrast, in our
solution there is an additional Riccati equation instead of the
coupled forward-backward equations. The coupled equations
in MFG depend on the initial mean-field while the Riccati
equation in our solution does not. It is shown in [29] that
when agents have decoupled dynamics, the MFG solution is
ε-team-optimal with ε ∈ O(1/√n). We obtain a similar result
for dynamically coupled agents with ε ∈ O(1/n).
Finally, in our opinion, the approach proposed in this paper
is easier to generalize than the approach of MFG. As a case
in point, considerable technical sophistication is needed in
the MFG theory to solve the so called major-minor setup
[30] (because the coupled forward-backward ODEs become
SDEs). In contrast, as we show in section III-A, the major-
minor setup is simply a special case of our model. For this
reason, we believe that the results presented in this paper and
the associated proof techniques may also be useful for MFG.
In many of the references cited above, the agent dynamics
are assumed to be decoupled. In our model, the agent dynamics
are coupled, which is significantly more challenging.3 This
is because, when the agent dynamics are decoupled, the
information structure is partially nested, so one may restrict
attention to linear strategies. Furthermore, for a finite horizon
system team-optimal strategies may be obtained by solving a
set of linear equations.4 In contrast, when the system dynamics
are coupled, the information structure is non-classical and
there is no general solution methodology to obtain a team-
optimal solution.
II. MAIN RESULTS
A. Exact solution for MFS-IS
We impose following standard assumptions on the model:
Assumption (A1) The primitive random variables
{x1, {wt}Tt=1} have zero mean and are mutually independent.
Assumption (A2) For every t, P xt , Put , Qkt , and Rkt are
symmetric matrices that satisfy
Qkt ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K, diag(Q1t , . . . , QKt ) + P xt ≥ 0, (10)
Rkt > 0, ∀k ∈ K, diag(R1t , . . . , RKt ) + Put > 0. (11)
Note that we do not require the initial state x1 and the
disturbance wt to be independent across agents. Nor do we
3Also see [24, Remark 13] for the difficulties in extending the proof
technique used in mean-field games to systems with coupled dynamics.
4It is shown in [9] that a finite horizon system with partially nested
information structure may be converted to a static team by an appropriate
change of variables. The optimal control laws for such a static team may
be obtained by solving a set of linear equations [31]. The key conceptual
challenge in such problem is to identify sufficient statistics such that the
optimal control laws can be computed efficiently and the results can generalize
to infinite-horizon setup.
require matrices P xt and P
u
t to be positive semi-definite as
long as (10)–(11) hold.
Theorem 1 Under (A1), (A2), and (MFS-IS), we have the
following results for Problem 1.
1) Structure of optimal strategy: The optimal strategy for
Problem 1 is unique and is linear in the local state and
the mean-field of the system. In particular,
uit = L˘
k
t (x
i
t − x¯kt ) + L¯kt x¯t, (12)
where the gains {L˘kt , L¯kt }T−1t=1 are obtained by the so-
lution of K + 1 Riccati equations given below: one
for computing each L˘kt , k ∈ K, and one for L¯t :=
rows(L¯1t , . . . , L¯
K
t ).
2) Riccati equations: Let
A¯t := diag(A
1
t , . . . , A
K
t ) + rows(D
1
t , . . . , D
K
t ),
B¯t := diag(B
1
t , . . . , B
K
t ) + rows(E
1
t , . . . , E
K
t ),
Q¯t := diag(Q
1
t , . . . , Q
K
t ), R¯t := diag(R
1
t , . . . , R
K).
Then, for t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}:
L˘kt = −
(
(Bkt )
ᵀ
M˘kt+1B
k
t +R
k
t
)−1
(Bkt )
ᵀ
M˘kt+1A
k
t ,
L¯t = −
(
B¯ᵀt M¯t+1B¯t + R¯t + P
u
t
)−1
B¯ᵀt M¯t+1A¯t,
where {M˘kt }Tt=1 and {M¯t}Tt=1 are the solutions of
following Riccati equations:
M˘k1:T = DRET(A
k
1:T , B
k
1:T , Q
k
1:T , R
k
1:T ), (13)
M¯1:T = DRET(A¯1:T , B¯1:T , Q¯1:T + P
x
1:T , R¯1:T + P
u
1:T ).
(14)
3) Optimal performance: Let
Σ˘kt :=
1
|N k|
∑
i∈Nk
var(wit − w¯kt ), Σ¯t := var(w¯t),
Ξ˘k :=
1
|N k|
∑
i∈Nk
var(xi1 − x¯k1), Ξ¯ := var(x¯1).
Then, the optimal cost is given by
J∗ =
∑
k∈K
Tr(Ξ˘kM˘k1 ) + Tr(Ξ¯M¯1)
+
T−1∑
t=1
[∑
k∈K
Tr(Σ˘kt M˘
k
t+1) + Tr(Σ¯tM¯t+1)
]
. (15)
The proof is presented in section IV. Note that the dimen-
sions of Riccati equations (13) and (14) do not depend on
the size of the sub-populations (|N 1|, . . . , |NK |). Hence, the
solution complexity depends only on the number K of sub-
populations and it is independent of the number of agents
in each sub-population. To implement the optimal control
strategies:
• all agents must compute L¯1:T−1 by solving the Riccati
equation (14),
• agents of sub-population k must compute L˘k1:T−1 by
solving the Riccati equation (13).
Then, an individual agent i of sub-population k, upon observ-
ing the local state xit and the global mean-field x¯t, chooses
6its local control action according to (12). Note that each agent
needs to solve only two Riccati equations, although there are
K + 1 Riccati equations in Theorem 1.
Remark 2 An interesting feature of the solution is that all
agents in a particular sub-population use identical control laws.
This is a feature of the linear quadratic system and not of
exchangeability. See [32] for an example of an exchangeable
system where the optimal control laws are not identical for all
agents in a sub-population.
Remark 3 If the per-step cost has cross-terms involving
(xit, x¯t) and (u
i
t, u¯t), i.e.,∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
1
|N k|
[
(xit)
ᵀ
Sx,kt x¯t + (u
i
t)
ᵀ
Su,kt u¯t
]
,
then, this cost can be re-written in the form of (6) and (7):
x¯ᵀt S
x
t x¯t + u¯
ᵀ
t S
u
t u¯t,
where
Sxt := rows(S
x,1
t , . . . , S
x,K
t ), S
u
t := rows(S
u,1
t , . . . , S
u,K
t ).
Remark 4 We assumed that there are no cross-terms of the
form xᵀSu in the per-step cost of (3) and (4). If such cross-
terms are present, there will be cross-terms involving (xit, u
i
t),
(xit, u¯t), (x¯t, u
i
t), and (x¯t, u¯t) in the equivalent mean-field
model presented in Proposition 1. These cross-terms can be
treated in the standard manner as cross-terms are treated in
centralized LQR.
Remark 5 Suppose in addition to (A1), we have that
{xi1, {wit}t≥1}i∈N are independent and for any k ∈ K,
(xi1)i∈Nk is i.i.d. with variance Ξ
k and {wit}i∈Nk is i.i.d. with
variance Σkt . Then, we have
Σ˘kt =
|N k| − 1
|N k| Σ
k
t , Σ¯t = diag(Σ
1
t , . . . ,Σ
K
t ),
Ξ˘k =
|N k| − 1
|N k| Ξ
k, Ξ¯ = diag(Ξ1, . . . ,ΞK).
The expression of total cost (15) can be simplified accordingly.
B. Approximate solution for PMFS-IS
In this section, we consider Problem 1 under PMFS-IS.
Based on the results of Theorem 1, we propose a certainty
equivalence strategy for PMFS-IS and show that the perfor-
mance of this strategy is close to the optimal performance
under MFS-IS. We impose the following assumptions on the
model.
Assumption (A1a) In addition to (A1), for any k ∈ S and
k′ ∈ Sc, initial states (xi1)i∈Nk are independent of (xj1)j∈Nk′ .
Assumption (A1b) The primitive random variables
{xi1, {wit}Tt=1}i∈N are independent. For any k, k ∈ K,
there exist finite matrices ckx and c
k
w such that
sup
i∈Nk
var(xi1) ≤ ckx, sup
t≤T,i∈Nk
var(wit) ≤ ckw.
Assumption (A3) The dynamics {Akt , Bkt , Dkt , Ekt }k∈K, cost
{Qkt , Rkt , }k∈K, P xt and Put , and covariance bounds
{ckx, ckw}k∈K do not depend on the sizes (|N 1|, . . . , |NK |) of
the sub-populations.
Since we are comparing the system performance under two
information structures, we use different notation for the two.
Under MFS-IS, the state and action of agent i are denoted by
xit and u
i
t. Assume that u
i
t is generated as per Theorem 1.
Under PMFS-IS, the state and action of agent i are denoted
by sit and v
i
t. The dynamics are same as (5). In particular for
agent i of sub-population k ∈ K, si1 = xi1 and
sit+1 = A
k
t s
i
t +B
k
t v
i
t +D
k
t s¯t + E
k
t v¯t + w
i
t, (16)
where
s¯t = vec(s¯
1
t , . . . , s¯
K
t ), s¯
k
t = 〈(sit)i∈Nk〉,
v¯t = vec(v¯
1
t , . . . , v¯
K
t ), v¯
k
t = 〈(vit)i∈Nk〉.
To describe the control strategy, we define a process {zt}Tt=1
as follows: zt = vec(z1t , . . . , z
K
t ), where for any k ∈ K,
zkt ∈ Rd
k
x ; the initial state z1 is given by zk1 is s¯
k
1 for k ∈ S
and is 0 for k /∈ S.5 The process evolves as:
zkt+1 =
{
s¯kt+1, k ∈ S,
Akt z
k
t + (B
k
t L¯
k
t +D
k
t + E
k
t L¯t)zt, k ∈ Sc,
(17)
where L¯t is as defined in Theorem 1. Note that zt is the
conditional estimate {s¯kt }k∈K given the common information
{s¯kt }k∈S ; therefore, it can be computed at all agents.
Now, consider the following certainty equivalence strategy
for PMFS-IS: for agent i of sub-population k, k ∈ K,
vit = L˘
k
t (s
i
t − zkt ) + L¯kt zt. (18)
The above strategy is similar to the optimal strategy for
MFS-IS (given by (12) in Theorem 1) except that the mean
field {s¯kt }k∈K has been replaced by its expected value zt.
For ease of exposition, let dx :=
∑
k∈K d
k
x and matrix H =
rows(H1, . . . ,HK) be a binary matrix such that
Hk =
{
0dkx×dx , k ∈ S,
1dkx×dx , k ∈ Sc.
Let Jˆ denote the performance of strategy (18) and J∗ denote
the optimal performance under MFS-IS. Then, the difference
in performance Jˆ − J∗ is bounded. In particular, we have
Theorem 2 Assume (A1a), (A2), and (PMFS-IS). Then,
1) The performance loss is given by
Jˆ − J∗ = Tr(X˜1M˜1) +
T−1∑
t=1
Tr(W˜tM˜t+1), (19)
where X˜1 = 12dx×2dx ⊗ [H ◦ var(x¯1)], W˜t =
12dx×2dx ⊗ [H ◦ var(w¯t)], and M˜1:T is the solution of
following Lyapunov equation:
M˜1:T = DLET(A˜1:T , Q˜1:T ), (20)
where
A˜ =
[
A˜1t −(1dx×dx −H) ◦ A˜2t
0 H ◦ A˜2t
]
,
and Q˜t = diag(−Q˜1t , Q˜2t ) where A˜1t = A¯t + B¯tL¯t,
5If the initial states are non-zero mean, then zk1 = E(x¯k1) for k /∈ S.
7A˜2t = A¯t + B¯tL˘t, Q˜
1
t = P
x
t + Q¯t + L¯
ᵀ
t (P
u
t + R¯t)L¯t,
Q˜2t = P
x
t +Q¯t+L˘
ᵀ
t (P
u
t +R¯t)L˘t, and L˘t = diag(L˘
1
t , . . . ,
L˘Kt ).
2) Let n = mink∈Sc(|N k|). Under (A1b) and (A3),
Jˆ − J∗ ∈ O
(
T
n
)
.
The result is proved in Section V.
Remark 6 As the number of agents in each sub-population
k ∈ Sc, becomes large, the approximation error Jˆ − J∗ goes
to zero; therefore, PMFS-IS is as informative as MFS-IS.
Note that when the mean-field of all sub-populations are
shared, then S = K and, therefore, H is zero. Consequently,
the approximation error given by (19) is zero. Hence, the result
of Theorem 2 is consistent with Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 When the mean-field is not shared, i.e., S = ∅,
the approximation error Jˆ − J∗ is
Tr
(
var(x¯1)(M˜
2
1 −M˜11 )
)
+
T−1∑
t=1
Tr(var
(
w¯t)(M˜
2
t+1−M˜1t+1)
)
,
where M˜11:T and M˜
2
1:T are the solutions of following two
decoupled Lyapunov equations:
M˜11:T = DLET(A˜
1
1:T , Q˜
1
1:T ), M˜
2
1:T = DLET(A˜
2
1:T , Q˜
2
1:T ).
Proof: When S = ∅, H is 1dx×dx ; thus, A˜t is block
diagonal. Consequently, the Lyapunov equation (20) decouples
into the two smaller Lyapunov equations given above.
III. SPECIAL CASES AND GENERALIZATIONS
In this section, we show that our results generalize to varia-
tions of Problem 1. Due to space limitations, we only present
the results for MFS-IS (i.e., the analogue of Theorem 1); the
results for PMFS (i.e., the analogue of Theorem 2) may be
derived in a similar manner.
A. Major Agent and a Population of Minor Agents
Suppose there exists one sub-population, say 1, with only 1
agent, i.e., |N 1| = 1. Then, x¯11 = x1t . The rest of the dynamics
and cost are the same as in Section I-D. Since the dynamics
are coupled through the mean-field, the state of the agent of
sub-population 1 directly influences the dynamics of all other
agents and the per-step cost. For this reason, such an agent is
called a major agent. A variation of the above model was first
introduced in [30] and other variations have been investigated
in [33]–[35].
For above model, result of Theorem 1 simplifies as follows.
Corollary 2 For any sub-population k ∈ K\{1} and minor
agent i ∈ N k, uit is given by (12). For the major agent, the
control law is given by u1t = L¯
1
t x¯t.
Note that L˘1t is not needed to compute u
1
t ; so we do not
need a Riccati equation to compute M˘11:T .
B. No local controls
Suppose that for all k ∈ K, Bkt = 0 and Rkt = 0. Moreover
assume that there exists a vector θt = rows(θ1t , . . . , θ
K
t ), θ
k
t ∈
Rdu˜ × Rdu , k ∈ K, such that Ekt = E˜kt θᵀt for all k ∈ K and
Put = θ
ᵀ
t P˜
u
t θt. In addition, let θ
k
t
+ denote the right inverse
of θkt (i.e., θ
k
t θ
k
t
+
= IRdu˜ ), which is assumed to exist. This
implies that the dynamics and cost are given as follows. Let
u˜t := θ
ᵀ
t u¯t =
∑
k∈K
θkt u¯
k
t .
Then, for agent i ∈ N k of sub-population k ∈ K, we have
xit+1 = A
k
t x
i
t +D
k
t x¯t + E˜
k
t u˜t + w
i
t.
At time t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, the per-step cost is given by,
ct(xt,ut, x¯t, u˜t) = x¯
ᵀ
t P
x
t x¯t + u˜
ᵀ
t P˜
u
t u˜t
+
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
1
|N k| (x
i
t)
ᵀ
Qtx
i
t,
and t = T ,
cT (xT , x¯T ) = x¯
ᵀ
TP
x
T x¯T +
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
1
|N k| (x
i
T )
ᵀ
QTx
i
T .
Corollary 3 For the model described above, the optimal
control law is given as follows. For all k ∈ K and i ∈ N k,
uit = θ
k
t
+
L˜kt x¯
k
t .
where [L˜1t , . . . , L˜
K
t ] =: L¯t is given as in Theorem 1 but with
B¯t replaced by B˜t = rows(E˜1t , . . . , E˜
K
t ) and P
u
t replaced
by P˜ut .
The proof is presented in Section IV-C.
Remark 7 Note that for the model defined above, each agent
only needs to observe the mean-field of its sub-population
(rather than the mean-field of entire population). Thus, this
result is similar in spirit to [36, Theorem 1].
C. Tracking cost function
Consider a tracking problem in which we are given a
tracking signal {skt }Tt=1, skt ∈ Rd
k
x for the mean-field of sub-
population k ∈ K and a tracking signal {rit}Tt=1, rit ∈ Rd
k
x ,
for each agent i ∈ N k.
Define r¯kt := 〈(rit)i∈Nk〉, k ∈ K, r¯t := vec(r¯1, . . . , r¯Kt ), and
st = vec(s
1
t , . . . , s
K
t ). The tracking cost is as follows. For
t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1},
ct(xt,ut, x¯t, u¯t) = (x¯t − st)ᵀP xt (x¯t − st) + u¯ᵀt Put u¯t
+
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
1
|N k|
[
(xit − rit)
ᵀ
Qkt (x
i
t − rit) + (uit)ᵀRkt uit
]
,
and for t = T ,
cT (xT , x¯T ) = (x¯T − sT )ᵀP xT (x¯T − sT )
+
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
1
|N k| (x
i
T − riT )
ᵀ
QkT (x
i
T − riT ).
8We assume that, in addition to MFS-IS specified in Sec-
tion I-D2, agent i also knows signals {rit, r¯t, st}Tt=1. The rest
of the model is the same as in Section I-D.
Theorem 3 Under (A1), (A2), and (MFS-IS), the optimal
strategy is unique and given by
uit = L˘
k
t (x
i
t − x¯kt ) + L¯kt x¯t + F˘ kt vit + F¯ kt v¯t, (21)
where the gains {L˘kt , L¯kt }T−1t=1 are obtained by the solution
of K + 1 Riccati equations defined in Theorem 1 and the
gains {F˘ kt , F¯ kt }T−1t=1 and the correction signals {vit, v¯t}Tt=1 are
given as follows. Let {M˘kt }Tt=1 and {M¯t}Tt=1 be the solutions
of K + 1 Riccati equations defined in Theorem 1. For t ∈
{1, . . . , T − 1}, the gains {F˘ kt , F¯ kt }Tt=1 are given by
F˘ kt =
(
(Bkt )
ᵀ
M˘kt+1B
k
t +R
k
t
)−1
Bkt
ᵀ
,
and rows(F¯ 1t , . . . , F¯
K
t ) := F¯t, where
F¯t =
(
B¯ᵀt M¯t+1B¯t + R¯t + P
u
t
)−1
B¯ᵀt .
The correction signals {vit, v¯t}Tt=1 are given recursively as
follows: for t = T ,
viT = Q
k
T r
i
T , v¯T = Q¯T r¯T + P
x
T sT , (22)
and for t ∈ {T − 1, . . . , 1},
vit = (A
k
t +B
k
t L˘
k
t )
ᵀ
vit+1 +Q
k
t r
i
t, (23)
v¯t = (A¯t + B¯tL¯t)
ᵀ
v¯t+1 + Q¯tr¯t + P
x
t st. (24)
The proof is presented in Section IV-D. To implement the
optimal control strategies:
• all agents must compute L¯1:T−1 and F¯1:T−1 by solving
Riccati equation (14) and compute the global correction
signal v¯1:T by solving backward equations (22) and (24),
• agents of sub-population k must compute L˘k1:T−1 and
F˘ k1:T−1 by solving Riccati equation (13),
• an individual agent i of sub-population k must compute
a local correction signal vi1:T by solving backward equa-
tions (22) and (23).
Then, an individual agent i of sub-population k, upon observ-
ing the local state xit and the global mean-field x¯t, chooses
its local control action according to (21).
D. Systems coupled through weighted mean-field
Suppose there are weights (ai, λi, bi) associated with each
agent i ∈ N such that ai, λi ∈ R and bi ∈ R>0. For each sub-
population k ∈ K define the weighted mean-field of states and
actions as follows.
x¯k,λt =
1
|N k|
∑
i∈Nk
λixit, u¯
k,λ
t =
1
|N k|
∑
i∈Nk
λiuit,
x¯λt = vec(x¯
1,λ, . . . , x¯K,λ), u¯λt = vec(u¯
1,λ, . . . , u¯K,λ).
Also, define a¯k,λ = 1|Nk|
∑
i∈Nk λ
iai. For sub-population k ∈
K, the state of agent i ∈ N k evolves as follows.
xit+1 = A
k
t x
i
t +B
k
t u
i
t + a
i(Dkt x¯
λ
t + E
k
t u¯
λ
t ) + w
i
t.
The per-step cost is given by
ct(xt,ut, x¯
λ
t , u¯
λ
t ) = (x¯
λ
t )
ᵀ
P xt x¯
λ
t + (u¯
λ
t )
ᵀ
Put u¯
λ
t
+
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
b1
|N k|
[
(xit)
ᵀ
Qkt x
i
t + (u
i
t)
ᵀ
Rkt u
i
t
]
,
and the terminal cost is given by
cT (xT , x¯
λ
T ) = (x¯
λ
T )
ᵀ
P xT x¯
λ
T +
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
bi
|N k|
[
(xiT )
ᵀ
QkTx
i
T
]
.
Such models arise in applications where the interaction be-
tween two homogeneous agents is not symmetric but depends
on their weights. For example, in wireless networks, the
interference caused at the base-station depends on the distance
of the agents from the base-station. We assume that the weights
are related as follows.
Assumption (A4) For each sub-population k ∈ K and each
agent i ∈ N k, aibi = λia¯k,λ.
Given a sub-population k ∈ K, examples of weights that
satisfy (A4) are: for all i ∈ N k, (i) ai = 0, (ii) ai = 1 and
bi = λi, (iii) ai = λi, bi = 1, and 1|Nk|
∑
i∈Nk λ
i = 1. To
simplify the exposition, define µk := 2− 1|Nk|
∑
i∈Nk
(λi)2
bi .
Assumption (A2a) For every t, P xt , Put , Qkt , and Rkt are
symmetric matrices that satisfy
Qkt ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K, diag(µ1Q1t , . . . , µKQKt ) + P xt ≥ 0,
Rkt > 0, ∀k ∈ K, diag(µ1R1t , . . . , µKRKt ) + Put > 0.
Note that if µk = 1, (A2a) reduces to (A2). Each agent has
mean-field sharing information structure, i.e., agent i ∈ N k
of sub-population k ∈ K observes the local state xit and the
weighted mean-field x¯λt .
Theorem 4 Under (A1), (A2a), (A4), and (MFS-IS), the op-
timal strategy is unique and given by
uit = L˘
k
t
(
xit −
λi
bi
x¯k,λt
)
+
λi
bi
L¯kt x¯
λ
t ,
where the gains {L˘kt , L¯kt }T−1t=1 are obtained by the solution of
K + 1 Riccati equations defined in Theorem 1 when A¯t, B¯t,
Q¯t, and R¯t are replaced by
A¯t := diag(A
1
t , . . . , A
K
t ) + rows(a¯
1,λD1t , . . . , a¯
K,λDKt ),
B¯t := diag(B
1
t , . . . , B
K
t ) + rows(a¯
1,λE1t , . . . , a¯
K,λEKt ),
Q¯t := diag(µ
1Q1t , . . . , µ
KQKt ),
R¯t := diag(µ
1R1t , . . . , µ
KRKt ).
Proof of Theorem 4 is presented in Section IV-E.
Remark 8 The optimal strategy depends on the weights and,
even within a sub-population, the gains of the mean-field terms
are different for different agents.
Remark 9 If the dynamics of the agents are decoupled, i.e.,
ai = 0 for all agens, then the results of Theorem 4 are similar
to the model with soft constraints discussed in [13].
Note that if ai = bi = λi = 1 for all agents, then
the weighted mean-field model reduces to the basic model
9described in Proposition 1 and the result of Theorem 4 reduces
to that of Theorem 1.
IV. PROOF OF THE RESULTS FOR MFS-IS
The main idea of the proof is as follows. We construct
an auxiliary system whose state, control actions, and per-
step cost are equivalent to xt, ut, and ct(·), respectively
(modulo a change of variables that we describe later). How-
ever, this auxiliary system is centrally controlled by a single
agent that has access to all the information available to the
N decentralized agents in the original system. We show that
the optimal centralized solution of this auxiliary system can
be implemented in the original decentralized system, and is
therefore also optimal for the decentralized system.
A. The auxiliary system
Define x˘it = x
i
t−x¯kt and u˘it = uit−u¯kt . The auxiliary system
is a centralized system with state x˚t = vec((x˘it)i∈N , x¯t) and
action u˚t = vec((u˘it)i∈N , u¯t). Note that x˚t is equivalent to xt
and u˚t is equivalent to ut.
The dynamics and cost of the auxiliary model are same as
the model of Proposition 1. This implies that we can write,
x˘it+1 = A
k
t x˘
i
t +B
k
t u˘
i
t + w˘
i
t, (25)
where w˘it := w
i
t − w¯kt and w¯kt := 〈(wit)i∈Nk〉 and
x¯t+1 = A¯tx¯t + B¯tu¯t + w¯t, (26)
where w¯t := vec(w¯1t , . . . , w¯
K
t ) and A¯t and B¯t are defined
as in Theorem 1. In the auxiliary system, there is a single
centralized agent that chooses u˚t based on the observations.
In particular, the centralized agent observes x˚t and chooses
u˚t according to
u˚t = g˚t(˚x1:t, u˚1:t−1). (27)
The performance of strategy g˚ := (˚g1, . . . , g˚T ) is given by
J˚ (˚g) = Eg˚
[ T−1∑
t=1
ct(xt,ut, x¯t, u¯t) + cT (xT , x¯T )
]
, (28)
where the expectation is with respect to the measure induced
on all system variables by the choice of strategy g˚. We are
interested in the following optimization problem.
Problem 2 In the auxiliary model, find strategy g˚∗ that min-
imizes (28), i.e.,
J˚∗ := J˚ (˚g∗) = inf
g˚
J˚ (˚g),
where the infimum is taken over all strategies of the form (27).
Let J∗ and J˚∗ denote the optimal cost for Problem 1 and
Problem 2, respectively. Since the per-step cost is the same
in both cases, but Problem 2 is centralized, we have that
J∗ ≥ J˚∗. We identify the optimal control laws for the auxiliary
system and show that these laws can be implemented in, and
therefore are optimal for, the original decentralized system.
A critical step in the proof is to rewrite the per-step cost
ct(xt,ut, x¯t, u¯t) and terminal cost cT (xT , x¯T ) in terms of x˚t
and u˚t. For that matter, we need the following key result that
is similar to Huygens-Steiner Theorem in mechanics [37]:
Lemma 1 For any x = vec(x1, . . . , xN ) and x¯ = 〈x〉, let
x˘i = xi − x¯, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Then, for any matrix Q of
appropriate dimension,
1
N
N∑
i=1
(xi)
ᵀ
Qxi =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(x˘i)
ᵀ
Qx˘i + x¯ᵀQx¯.
Proof: The result follows from elementary algebra and
the observation that
∑N
i=1 x˘
i = 0.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 1 is the following:
Corollary 4 For time t, t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, there exists function
c˚t, such that for t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, ct(xt,ut, x¯t, u¯t) =
c˚t(˚xt, u˚t) and for t = T , cT (xT , x¯T ) = c˚T (˚xT ). In particular,
for t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1},
c˚t(˚xt, u˚t) = c¯t(x¯t, u¯t) +
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
c˘kt (x˘
i
t, u˘
i
t),
where
c¯t(x¯t, u¯t) = x¯
ᵀ
t (Q¯t + P
x
t )x¯t + u¯
ᵀ
t (R¯t + P
u
t )u¯t,
c˘kt (x˘
i
t, u˘
i
t) =
1
|N k|
[
(x˘it)
ᵀ
Qkt x˘
i
t + (u˘
i
t)
ᵀ
Rkt u˘
i
t
]
,
and for t = T,
c˚T (˚xT ) = c¯T (x¯T ) +
∑
i∈Nk,k∈K
c˘kT (x˘
i
T ),
where
c¯T (x¯T ) = x¯
ᵀ
T (Q¯T + P
x
T )x¯T , c˘
k
T (x˘
i
T ) =
1
|N k| (x˘
i
T )
ᵀ
QkT x˘
i
T .
The auxiliary system is a centralized LQR system. So, the
optimal control laws are linear and the optimal gains are given
by the solution of an appropriate Riccati equation. However,
the dimension of the state x˚t, and therefore the dimension of
the Riccati equation, increases with the number of agents. We
present an alternative approach that involves solving K + 1
Riccati equations that do not depend on the number of agents.
B. The Optimal Solution of the Auxiliary System
The auxiliary system is a stochastic linear quadratic system.
From the certainty equivalence principle [38], we know that
the optimal control law is unique and identical to the control
law in the corresponding deterministic system, whose dynam-
ics are given as follows: for k ∈ K and i ∈ N k
x˘it+1 = A
k
t x˘
i
t +B
k
t u˘
i
t, x¯t+1 = A¯tx¯t + B¯tu¯t,
and whose per-step cost is c˚t(˚xt, u˚t) given by Corollary 4.
Note that this system consists of (N + 1) components:
N components with state x˘it and action u˘
i
t, i ∈ N , and
one component with state x¯t and action u¯t. The first N
components are split into K classes of identical components—
one for each sub-population. The components have decoupled
dynamics and decoupled cost. Thus, the optimal control law
of each class may be identified separately. In particular,
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Theorem 5 The optimal control strategy of the auxiliary
model is unique and given by
u¯t = L¯tx¯t and for k ∈ K, i ∈ N k, u˘it = L˘kt x˘it,
where the gains {L˘kt , L¯t}T−1t=1 are given as in Theorem 1.
To complete the proof of Theorem 1, note that
uit = u˘
i
t + u¯
k
t = L˘
k
t (x
i
t − x¯kt ) + L¯kt x¯t.
Thus, the control laws specified in Theorem 1 are the optimal
centralized control laws, and, a fortiori, the optimal decentral-
ized control laws.
C. Proof of Corollary 3
Under the assumptions on the model, the dynamics, given
by (25) and (26), simplify to
x˘it+1 = A
k
t x˘
i
t + w˘
i
t, x¯t+1 = A¯tx¯t + B˜tu˜t + w¯t,
and c¯t(x¯t, u¯t) of Corollary 4 simplifies to
c¯t(x¯t, u¯t) = x¯
ᵀ
t (Q¯t + P
x
t )x¯t + u˜
ᵀ
t (P˜
u
t )u˜t. (29)
Thus, the N subsystems corresponding to x˘it are uncontrolled
and we need to identify u˜t to optimally control the dynamics
of mean-field x¯t with per-step cost given by (29). Hence, the
optimal solution is given by
u˜t = L¯tx¯t =
∑
k∈K
L˜kt x¯
k
t ,
where L¯t is computed as explained in Corollary 3. To complete
the proof, note that if agent i ∈ N k of sub-population k ∈ K
chooses action uit = θ
k
t
+
L˜kt x¯
k
t , then we get θ
k
t u¯
k
t = L˜
k
t x¯
k
t ;
consequently, u˜t =
∑
k∈K θ
k
t u¯
k
t =
∑
k∈K L˜
k
t x¯
k
t .
D. Proof of Theorem 3
As in the proof of Theorem 1 described in Section IV, define
x˘it = x
i
t − x¯kt , u˘it = uit − u¯kt , x˚t = vec((x˘it)i∈N , x¯t), and
u˚t = vec((u˘
i
t)i∈N , u¯t). We identify a cost function c˚t(˚xt, u˚t)
as in Corollary 4.
Lemma 2 For time t, t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, there exists function c˚t,
such that for t ∈ {1, . . . , T−1}, ct(xt,ut, x¯t, u¯t) = c˚t(˚xt, u˚t)
and for t = T , cT (xT ) = c˚T (˚xT ). In particular, for t ∈
{1, . . . , T − 1},
c˚t(˚xt, u˚t) = c¯t(x¯t, u¯t)+
∑
i∈Nk,k∈K
c˘kt (x˘
i
t, u˘
i
t)−
∑
k∈K
(r¯kt )
ᵀ
Qkt r¯
k
t ,
and for t = T ,
c˚T (˚xT ) = c¯T (x¯T ) +
∑
i∈Nk,k∈K
c˘kT (x˘
i
T )−
∑
k∈K
(r¯kT )
ᵀ
QkT r¯
k
T .
To describe c¯t(·), define yt :=
[
x¯t−r¯t
x¯t−st
]
. Then,
c¯t(x¯t, u¯t) = y
ᵀ
t
[
Q¯t 0
0 P xt
]
yt + u¯
ᵀ
t (R¯t + P
u
t )u¯t,
c¯T (x¯T ) = y
ᵀ
T
[
Q¯T 0
0 P xT
]
yT .
Moreover,
c˘kt (x˘
i
t, u˘
i
t) =
1
|N k|
[
(x˘it − rit)ᵀQkt (x˘it − rit) + (u˘it)ᵀRkt u˘it
]
,
c˘kT (x˘
i
T ) =
1
|N k|
[
(x˘iT − riT )ᵀQkT (x˘iT − riT )
]
.
Note that the per-step cost is decomposed into terms that
depend only on (x¯t, u¯t) and terms that depend only on (x˘it, u˘
i
t)
(and terms that do not depend on the control strategy). The
rest of the proof follows along the same lines of the proof
of Theorem 1. In particular, we consider a deterministic
dynamical system and split it into K+1 classes. The agents in
class k, k ∈ K, are solving a tracking problem whose solution
is given by
u˘it = L˘
k
t x˘
i
t + F˘
k
t v
i
t.
The mean-field component is also solving a tracking problem
whose solution is given by
u¯t = L¯tx¯t + F¯tv¯t.
The result of the Theorem follows from combining the above
equations. Therefore, from standard results in LQR tracking
problem, the optimal control law of agent i ∈ N k of sub-
population k ∈ K is given by
uit = u˘
i
t + u¯
k
t =
[
L˘kt (x
i
t − x¯kt ) + F˘ kt vit
]
+
[
L¯kt x¯t + F¯
k
t v¯t
]
,
where gains {L˘kt , L¯kt , F˘ kt , F¯ kt }T−1t=1 are identical for all agents
of sub-population k, v¯t is identical for all agents of all sub-
populations, and vit may be different for each agent.
E. Proof of Theorem 4
The proof follows the same lines as the proof of The-
orem 1 with the following differences. The mean-field is
defined as x¯k,λt =
1
|Nk|
∑
i∈Nk λ
ixit (similar interpretations
hold for u¯k,λt and w¯
k,λ
t ) and the breve variables are defined
as x˘it = x
i
t − λ
i
bi x¯
k,λ
t (similar interpretations hold for u˘
i
t and
w˘it). Note that due to (A4), the dynamics of x˘
i
t and x¯
λ
t are
still given by (25) and (26), respectively, where A¯t and B¯t are
defined as in Theorem 4.
The equivalent of Lemma 1 is the following:
Lemma 3 Let (λ1, . . . , λN ) ∈ RN and (b1, . . . , bN ) ∈ RN>0.
In addition, for any x = vec(x1, . . . , xN ) and x¯λ =
〈(λixi)Ni=1〉, let x˘i = xi − λ
i
bi x¯
λ, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Then, for
any matrix Q of appropriate dimension,
1
N
N∑
i=1
bi(xi)
ᵀ
Qxi =
1
N
N∑
i=1
bi(x˘i)
ᵀ
Qx˘i + (x¯λ)
ᵀ
µQx¯λ,
where µ := 2− 1N
∑N
i=1
(λi)2
bi .
Consequently, the equivalent of Corollary 4 is the following
Corollary 5 For time t, t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, there exists function
c˚t, such that for t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, ct(xt,ut, x¯λt , u¯λt ) =
c˚t(˚xt, u˚t) and for t = T , cT (xT , x¯λT ) = c˚T (˚xT ). In particular,
for t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1},
c˚t(˚xt, u˚t) = c¯t(x¯
λ
t , u¯
λ
t ) +
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
c˘it(x˘
i
t, u˘
i
t),
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where
c¯t(x¯
λ
t , u¯
λ
t ) = (x¯
λ
t )
ᵀ
(Q¯t + P
x
t )x¯
λ
t + (u¯
λ
t )
ᵀ
(R¯t + P
u
t )u¯
λ
t ,
c˘it(x˘
i
t, u˘
i
t) =
bi
|N k|
[
(x˘it)
ᵀ
Qkt x˘
i
t + (u˘
i
t)
ᵀ
Rkt u˘
i
t
]
,
and for t = T,
c˚T (˚xT ) = c¯T (x¯
λ
T ) +
∑
i∈Nk,k∈K
c˘iT (x˘
i
T ),
where
c¯T (x¯
λ
T ) = (x¯
λ
T )
ᵀ
(Q¯T + P
x
T )x¯
λ
T ,
c˘iT (x˘
i
T ) =
bi
|N k|
[
(x˘iT )
ᵀ
QkT x˘
i
T
]
,
where Q¯t and R¯t are defined as in Theorem 4.
The rest of the proof is the same as in Section IV-B. We
can show that the optimal control strategy of auxiliary model
is given by
u¯λt = L¯tx¯
λ
t and for k ∈ K, i ∈ N k, u˘it = L˘kt x˘it,
where the gains {L˘kt , L¯t}T−1t=1 are given as in Theorem 4. To
complete the proof of Theorem 4, note that
uit = u˘
i
t +
λi
bi
u¯k,λt = L˘
k
t
(
xit −
λi
bi
x¯k,λt
)
+
λi
bi
L¯kt x¯
λ
t .
Thus, the control laws specified in Theorem 4 are the optimal
centralized control laws, and, a fortiori, the optimal decentral-
ized control laws.
V. PROOF OF RESULTS FOR PMFS-IS
We simplify Jˆ − J∗ using the decomposition of per-step
cost presented in Corollary 4. In particular,
Lemma 4 For any k ∈ K and i ∈ N k, define s˘it = sit − s¯kt
and v˘it = v
i
t − v¯kt . Then, for all t, s˘it = x˘it and u˘i = v˘it.
Consequently,
Jˆ − J∗ =
T∑
t=1
[c¯t(s¯t, v¯t)− c¯t(x¯t, u¯t)] . (30)
Proof: We prove the first part by induction. Note that
x˘i1 = s˘
i
1 and v˘
i
1 = L˘
k
1 s˘
i
1 = L˘
k
1 x˘
i
1 = u˘
i
1. This forms the basis
of induction. Now assume that s˘it = x˘
i
t and v˘
i
t = u˘
i
t and
consider time t+ 1. Then,
s˘it+1 = A
k
t s˘
i
t +B
k
t v˘
i
t + w˘
i
t = A
k
t x˘
i
t +B
k
t u˘
i
t + w˘
i
t = x˘
i
t+1.
Moreover, v˘it+1 = L˘
k
t+1s˘
i
t+1 = L˘
k
t+1x˘
i
t+1 = u˘
i
t+1. Thus, the
result is true by induction. Equation (30) immediately follows
from the first part and Corollary 4.
Recall that c¯t(x¯t, u¯t) = x¯
ᵀ
t (Q¯t +P
x
t )x¯t + u¯
ᵀ
t (R¯t +P
u
t )u¯t.
Next we simplify (30) in terms of the following relative errors:
For any k ∈ K, define
ζkt = x¯
k
t − zkt and ξkt = s¯kt − zkt .
Let ζt = vec(ζ
1
t , . . . , ζ
K
t ) and ξt = vec(ξ
1
t , . . . , ξ
K
t ). For ease
of exposition, let vector h = vec(h1, . . . , hK) be binary such
that hk = 0dkx×1 if k ∈ S and hk = 1dkx×1 if k ∈ Sc.
Lemma 5 Let A˜t be defined as in Theorem 2. Then, ζ1 =
h ◦ x¯1 and ξ1 = h ◦ x¯1 and[
ζt+1
ξt+1
]
= A˜t
[
ζt
ξt
]
+
[
h ◦ w¯t
h ◦ w¯t
]
.
Proof: From (16) and (18), we get
s¯kt+1 = A
k
t s¯
k
t +B
k
t v¯
k
t +D
k
t s¯t + E
k
t v¯t + w¯
k
t ,
v¯kt = L˘
k
t (s¯
k
t − zkt ) + L¯kt zt, (31)
where w¯kt := 〈(wit)i∈Nk〉. Write (31) in a vectorized form,
s¯t+1 = A¯ts¯t + B¯tv¯t + w¯t, v¯t = L˘tξt + L¯tzt,
where w¯t = vec(w¯1k, . . . , w¯
K
t ). From Theorem 1, we can write
the dynamics under the optimal strategy as follows
x¯kt+1 = A
k
t x¯
k
t + (B
k
t L¯
k
t +D
k
t + E
k
t L¯t)x¯t + w¯
k
t ,
u¯kt = L¯
k
t x¯t,
and in a vectorized form,
x¯t+1 = (A¯t + B¯tL¯t)x¯t + w¯t, u¯t = L¯tx¯t.
Thus, the dynamics of the relative errors can be written as
follows. If k ∈ S,
ζkt+1 = A
k
t ζ
k
t + (B
k
t L¯
k
t +D
k
t + E
k
t L¯t)ζt
− (Akt +Bkt L˘kt )ξkt − (Dkt + Ekt L˘t)ξt,
ξkt+1 = 0,
and if k ∈ Sc,
ζkt+1 = A
k
t ζ
k
t + (B
k
t L¯
k
t +D
k
t + E
k
t L¯t)ζt + w¯
k
t ,
ξkt+1 = (A
k
t +B
k
t L˘
k
t )ξ
k
t + (D
k
t + E
k
t L˘t)ξt + w¯
k
t .
Combining these, gives the result of the Lemma.
Let Ft = {s¯k1:t}k∈S be the history of the mean-fields of
sub-populations S that are observed.
Lemma 6 For all t, E[ζt|Ft] = E[ξt|Ft] = 0.
Proof: If k ∈ S, ζk1 = ξk1 = 0 and if k ∈ Sc,
ζk1 = ξ
k
1 = x¯
k
1 , and from (A1a), E[x¯k1 |F1] = E[x¯k1 ] = 0.
Therefore, E[ζ1|F1] = E[ξ1|F1] = 0. Thus, from Lemma 5
and E[w¯t|Ft] = 0, we get that E[ζt|Ft] = E[ξt|Ft] = 0.
Lemma 7 zt is measurable with respect to Ft, therefore,
E[zt|Ft] = zt.
Proposition 2 The relative loss is given
Jˆ − J∗ = E
[
T∑
t=1
[ζt ξt]
ᵀQ˜t[ζt ξt]
]
.
Proof: Recall that c¯t(x¯t, u¯t) = x¯
ᵀ
t (Q¯t+P
x
t )x¯t+u¯
ᵀ
t (R¯t+
Put )u¯t. The proof follows immediately from (30) and the
following observation:
Lemma 8 Let Qˆt := Q¯t + P xt and Rˆt := R¯t + Put . Then,
E[s¯ᵀt Qˆts¯t − x¯ᵀt Qˆtx¯t|Ft] = E[ξᵀt Qˆtξt − ζᵀt Qˆtζt|Ft],
and
E[v¯ᵀt Rˆtv¯t − u¯ᵀt Rˆtu¯t|Ft] = E[ξᵀt L˘ᵀt RˆtL˘tξt|Ft]
− E[ζᵀt L¯ᵀt RˆtL¯tζt|Ft].
Therefore, the proof of Proposition 2 is complete.
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Proof of Lemma 8:
1) Substituting s¯t = ξt + zt and x¯t = ζt + zt, we get
E[s¯ᵀt Qˆts¯t − x¯ᵀt Qˆtx¯t|Ft]
(a)
= E[ξ
ᵀ
t Qˆtξt − ζᵀt Qˆtζt|Ft] + 2E[ξᵀt Qˆtzt|Ft]
− 2E[ζᵀt Qˆtzt|Ft]
= E[ξᵀt Qˆtξt − ζᵀt Qˆtζt|Ft],
where the last two terms in (a) are zero by Lemmas 6
and 7.
2) Substituting v¯t = L˘tξt+L¯tzt and u¯t = L¯tx¯t = L¯t(ζt+
zt), we get
E[v¯ᵀt Rˆtv¯t − u¯ᵀt Rˆtu¯t|Ft]
(b)
= E[ξᵀt L˘
ᵀ
t RˆtL˘tξt − ζᵀt L¯ᵀt RˆtL¯tζt|Ft]
+ 2E[ξᵀt L˘
ᵀ
t RˆtL¯tzt|Ft]− 2E[ζᵀt L¯tRˆtL¯tzt|Ft]
= E[ξᵀt L˘
ᵀ
t RˆtL˘tξt − ζᵀt L¯ᵀt RˆtL¯tζt|Ft],
where the last two terms in (b) are zero by Lemmas 6
and 7.
Proof of Theorem 2
To prove part 1, note that Jˆ − J∗ is the expected total
quadratic cost (given by Proposition 2) of a linear (uncon-
trolled) system ( given by Lemma 5). Thus, Jˆ − J∗ is
given by (19) where M˜1:T is the solution of the Lyapunov
equation (20). Note that the variance of the initial state and
noises in Lemma 5 are given as follows:
var(h ◦ x¯1, h ◦ x¯1) = 12dx×2dx ⊗ [H ◦ var(x¯1)] =: X˜1,
var(h ◦ w¯t, h ◦ w¯t) = 12dx×2dx ⊗ [H ◦ var(w¯t)] =: W˜t.
To prove part 2 of Theorem 2, first observe that due to
(A3), matrices A˜t and Q˜t do not depend on (|N 1|, . . . , |NK |);
therefore, neither does M˜1:T . Thus the only dependence on the
size of the sub-population is due to X˜1 and W˜t. Under (A1b)
and (A3), for any sub-population k ∈ K,
var(x¯k1) =
1
|N k|2
∑
i∈Nk
var(xi1) ≤
ckx
n
,
var(w¯kt ) =
1
|N k|2
∑
i∈Nk
var(wit) ≤
ckw
n
.
From (A1b), var(x¯1) = diag(var(x¯11), . . . , var(x¯
K
1 )) and
var(w¯t) = diag(var(w¯
1
t ), . . . , var(w¯
K
t )). Thus,
X˜1 ≤ 1
n
12dx×2dx ⊗
[
H ◦ diag(c1x, . . . , cKx )
]
,
W˜t ≤ 1
n
12dx×2dx ⊗
[
H ◦ diag(c1w, . . . , cKw )
]
.
Thus, X˜1 and W˜t are O( 1n ). From (19), we have
|Jˆ − J∗| ≤
∣∣∣Tr(X˜1M˜1)∣∣∣+ T−1∑
t=1
∣∣∣Tr(W˜t M˜t+1)∣∣∣,
where each of above absolute values is O( 1n ). In particular,
since X˜1 and W˜t are O( 1n ) and M˜1:T do not depend on n,
|Tr(X˜1M˜1|) and |Tr(W˜tM˜t+1)| are O( 1n ).
VI. INFINITE HORIZON
The results presented in Sections II and III general-
ize to infinite horizon setup in a natural manner. As-
sume that the model is time-invariant, i.e., the ma-
trices {Akt , Bkt , Dkt , Ekt , Qkt , Rkt , P xt , Put } and covariances
{Σ˘kt , Σ¯t, Ξ˘kt , Ξ¯t} (defined in Theorem 1) do not depend on
time; hence, we remove the subscript t. The rest of the model
is as same as that in Section I-D.
Consider the infinite horizon discounted cost and the infinite
horizon long-term average setups as follows:
Problem 3 Given discount factor β ∈ (0, 1), find a strategy g
that minimizes the following cost:
Jβ(g) = (1− β)Eg
[ ∞∑
t=1
βt−1c(xt,ut, x¯t, u¯t)
]
,
where the expectation is with respect to the measure induced
on all the system variables by the choice of strategy g.
Problem 4 Find a strategy g that minimizes the following
cost:
J1(g) = lim
T→∞
Eg
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
c(xt,ut, x¯t, u¯t)
]
,
where the expectation is with respect to the measure induced
on all the system variables by the choice of strategy g.
Assumption (A5) For each sub-population k ∈ K,
(
√
βAk,
√
βBk) are stabilizable and (
√
βAk,
√
Qk) are de-
tectable. In addition, for A¯t and B¯t defined in Theorem 1,
(
√
βA¯,
√
βB¯) are stabilizable and (
√
βA¯,
√
Q¯+ P x) are
detectable.
A. Exact solution for MFS-IS
The optimal strategy under MFS-IS is as follows.
Theorem 6 Under (A1), (A2), (A5), and (MFS-IS), the op-
timal strategy for Problems 3 and 4 are linear and time
homogeneous and are given by
uit = L˘
k(xit − x¯kt ) + L¯kx¯t, (32)
where the gains {L˘k, L¯k} are obtained by the solution of K+1
algebraic Riccati equations given below: one for computing
each L˘k, k ∈ K, and one for L¯ := rows(L¯1, . . . , L¯K). Let
matrices A¯, B¯, Q¯, and R¯ be defined as in Theorem 1; then,
given β ∈ (0, 1],
L˘k = −
(
Bk
ᵀ
M˘kBk + β−1Rk
)−1
Bk
ᵀ
M˘kAk,
L¯ = − (B¯ᵀM¯B¯ + β−1(R¯+ Pu))−1 B¯ᵀM¯A¯,
where M˘k and M¯ are the solutions of the following algebraic
Riccati equations:
M˘k = DAREβ(A
k, Bk, Qk, Rk),
M¯ = DAREβ(A¯, B¯, Q¯+ P
x, R¯+ Pu).
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In addition, the optimal performance is given by
J∗β = (1− β)
[∑
k∈K
Tr
(
Ξ˘kM˘k
)
+ Tr(Ξ¯M¯)
]
+
[∑
k∈K
Tr
(
Σ˘kM˘k
)
+ Tr(Σ¯M¯)
]
,
where Σ˘k, Σ¯, Ξ˘k, and Ξ¯ are defined as in Theorem 1.
Proof: The proof follows along the same lines of the
proof of Theorem 1. We construct an auxiliary system as
in Section IV, which consists of |N | + 1 components with
decoupled cost and dynamics coupled only through the noise.
Since the costs are infinite-horizon discounted and infinite-
horizon long run average, the optimal solution is given by
appropriate algebraic Riccati equations.6
B. Approximate solution for PMFS-IS
In this section, we propose an approximately optimal
strategy for Problems 3 and 4 under PMFS-IS. Let L˘ =
diag(L˘1, . . . , L˘K) denote a diagonal matrix with diagonal
terms of L˘k defined as in Theorem 6. We impose the following
assumption.
Assumption (A6)
√
β(A¯+ B¯L˘) is Hurwitz matrix.
Let Jˆβ denote the performance of strategy (32) where x¯t is
replaced by zt in (17) and J∗β denote the optimal performance
under MFS-IS. Then, the difference in performance Jˆβ − J∗β
is bounded. In particular, we have the following
Theorem 7 Assume (A1a), (A2), (A5), (A6) and (PMFS-IS).
Then, for β ∈ (0, 1], we have
1) The performance loss is given by
Jˆβ − J∗β = (1− β) Tr
(
X˜1M˜
)
+ Tr
(
W˜M˜
)
, (33)
where X˜1 and W˜ are time-homogeneous and defined
as in Theorem 2 and M˜ is the solution of following
algebraic Lyapunov equation:
M˜ = DALEβ(A˜, Q˜), (34)
where A˜ and Q˜ are defined as in Theorem 2 and L˘ =
diag(L˘1, . . . , L˘K) and L¯ are computed as in Theorem 6.
2) Let n = mink∈Sc(|N k|). Under (A1b) and (A3),
Jˆβ − J∗β ∈ O
(
1
n
)
.
Proof: The proof follows along the same lines of the proof
of Theorem 2. In particular, under (A5) and (A6),
√
βA˜ of
Proposition 2 is Hurwtiz; hence, the performance loss may be
computed by the associated algebraic Lyapunov equation given
by (34). Note that even though Q˜ is not positive semi-definite,
the algebraic Lyapunov equation has a solution [39]. The proof
of part 2 of Theorem 7 follows from (33) and observation
6Note that an infinite-horizon discounted problem with 4-tuple
(A,B,Q,R) and discount factor β is equivalent to an undiscounted
problem with 4-tuple (
√
βA,
√
βB,Q,R).
that (i) M˜ given by (34) does not depend on n due to (A3);
(ii) (X˜1, W˜ ) are O(1/n) due to (A1b).
Remark 10 Assumption (A6) is always satisfied if Dkt = 0
and Ekt = 0 for all k ∈ K. In this case,
√
β(A¯+ B¯L˘) is
diag(
√
β(A1 +B1L˘1), . . . ,
√
β(AK +BKL˘K)),
where each of the diagonal terms are Hurwitz by definition
of L˘k given in Theorem 6.
VII. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
To illustrate our results, we consider an example that is
motivated by demand response in power systems. In demand
response, the volatility in renewable generation is compensated
by making small changes in the demand of a large number
of loads. We model the load dynamics according to a model
proposed in [40], but consider a different per-step cost.
Consider a homogeneous population N of space heaters.
For space heater i, i ∈ N , the state xit denotes the room
temperature at time t. Consider a nominal temperature xnom
and let unom be the control input needed to maintain the room
temperature at xnom . Following [40], we linearize dynamics
around xnom , i.e.,
xit+1 − xnom = a(xit − xnom) + buit + wit,
where uit is control input in addition to unom and w
i
t is a
random disturbance. We assume unom is large enough such
that (uit + unom) is positive.
Let xides denote the desired temperature of user i. It is
assumed that the mean desired temperature x¯des is known
to everyone (e.g., independent system operator (ISO) could
compute it and broadcast the mean value to everyone or it
could be computed in a distributed manner using a consensus
algorithm). For the purpose of demand response, time is
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Fig. 1. Demand response with a population of 100 space heaters. In the
initial phase, 1 ≤ t ≤ 50, the system is uncontrolled. In the first epoch
50 < t ≤ 150, the system tracks a mean reference temperature of x¯ref = 21;
in the second epoch 150 < t ≤ 250, the system tracks a mean reference
temperature of x¯ref = 19. The thin lines show the local temperature of 30
out of the 100 space heaters. The thick red line shows the mean-temperature
achieved by the optimal strategy.
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divided into epochs of length T . At the beginning of each
epoch, a central authority such as an ISO generates a reference
mean temperature x¯ref and broadcasts it to all users.
During an epoch, all users collectively minimize the total
expected cost E[
∑T
t=1 ct], where the per-step cost ct is given
by
1
n
n∑
i=1
T − t
T
[
q(xit − xides)2 + ruit
2
]
+
t
T
p(x¯t − x¯ref )2.
The rationale for the per-step cost is that we penalize de-
viations from the desired temperature (which corresponds to
the user’s comfort level), the control effort, and deviation of
the mean temperature from the reference prescribed by the
ISO. The weights (T−tT ) and
t
T are so that we linearly move
from preferring individual preferences to preferring global
preferences.
The above problem is an optimal tracking problem and the
optimal strategy is given by Theorem 3. As an example, we
consider the following values of the parameters:
n = 100, a = 0.8, b = 1, q = 1, p = 10, r = 50,
T = 100, xnom = 20, w
i
t ∼ N (0, 0.01), xi1 ∼ N (20, 3)
and consider two epochs of length T = 100. In the initial
phase, 1 ≤ t ≤ 50, space heaters are operating around their
local set temperatures: In the first epoch, 50 < t ≤ 150, x¯ref =
21; in the second epoch, 150 < t ≤ 250, x¯ref = 19. The
resultant trajectories of a subset of the users are shown in
Fig. 1.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We presented team optimal control of a decentralized system
with partially exchangeable agents. Partial exchangeability
implies that such a system is equivalent to one where the
dynamics and the cost are coupled only through the mean-
field. Our two main results are as follows. First, when the mean
field is observed by all agents (the MFS information structure),
the linear control laws are optimal and the corresponding
gains are computed by solving K + 1 Riccati equations,
where K is the number of sub-populations. The dimensions
of these Riccati equations are independent of the size of sub-
populations; consequently, the solution complexity depends
only on the number K of sub-populations (rather than the
size of the entire population). Second, when the mean-field of
a (possibly empty) subset of sub-populations is observed by
all agents (the PMFS information structure), a linear control
law based on certainty equivalence is approximately optimal.
An important practical implication of these results is that
they do not suffer from the curse of dimensionality. In fact,
under assumption (A3), the solution does not even depend on
the number of agents and the optimal gains can be computed
without being aware of the size of each sub-population.
Consequently, the solution methodology generalizes to the
setup where the agents in a sub-population arrive and depart
according to an exogenous process (e.g. number of electric
vehicles plugged in for charging in smart grids).
The raison d’etre for investigating decentralized systems
is that it is possible—either physically or economically—to
send all the state observation to a centralized controller. We
show that when agents are partially exchangeable, we may
circumvent the conceptual difficulties of decentralized control
and achieve the centralized performance by sharing only the
mean-field (which can be shared using distributed algorithms
such as consensus). Thus, instead of requiring that agents have
the capability or the energy to communicate to a centralized
controller, agents only require the capacity or the energy to
communicate to their neighbors. Moreover, in view of the
results of PMFS-IS, one may even decide not to share the
mean-field of large sub-populations because there is only a
small loss in performance in using the estimated value of the
mean-field instead.
Throughout this paper, we assumed that when the mean-
field is observed, it is observed without noise. In practice
(especially if the mean-field is computed using a consensus
algorithm), the mean-field will be observed with noise (and
the noise will be different across agents). Our results show
that if all sub-populations are large, such an observation noise
will not matter. (In fact, the agents may completely ignore the
mean-field observations and use the estimated values instead).
However, if some of the sub-populations are small, the solution
approach is not obvious. In particular, in the special case when
all sub-populations have one agent, the problem reduces to
the general decentralized control problem with non-classical
information structure. Identifying a solution methodology for
this general case remains a challenging research direction.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Let Ai,jt denote the (i, j)-th element of matrix At. We
use a similar notation for other matrices as well. Fix a sub-
population k, k ∈ K. If we exchange agents i, j ∈ N k, then
property 2 of exchangeability implies that Ai,it = A
j,j
t and
for any other agent n ∈ N , Ai,nt = Aj,nt and An,it = An,jt .
(Similar relationships hold for Bt as well). Property 3 implies
that Qi,it = Q
j,j
t , Q
i,n
t = Q
j,n
t , and Q
n,i
t = Q
n,j
t . (Similar
relationships hold for Rt as well). Define the following:
• For i, j ∈ N k, Ai,it = Aj,jt and Bi,it = Bj,jt . Denote these
by akt and b
k
t , respectively.
• For i, j ∈ N k and n,m ∈ N l, l 6= k,Ai,nt = Aj,mt and
Bi,nt = B
j,m
t . Denote these by d
k,l
t and e
k,l
t , respectively.
• For i, j ∈ N k, Qi,it = Qj,jt and Ri,it = Rj,jt . Denote these
by qkt and r
k
t , respectively.
• For i, j ∈ N k and n,m ∈ N l, l 6= k,Qi,nt = Qj,mt
and Ri,nt = R
j,m
t . Denote these by p
x,k,l
t and p
u,k,l
t ,
respectively.
Now, consider the dynamics according to (2), the dynamics of
agent i of sub-population k can be written as
xit+1 = A
i·xt +Bi·ut + wit, (35)
where Ai· and Bi· denote the ith row of At and Bt. Note that
Ai·xt = Ai,it xit +
∑
j∈Nk,j 6=i
Ai,jt x
j
t +
∑
l∈K,l 6=k
∑
n∈N l
Ai,nxnt
= akt x
i
t + d
k,k
t
∑
j∈Nk,j 6=i
xjt +
∑
l∈K,l 6=k
dk,lt
∑
n∈N l
xnt
= akt x
i
t + d
k,k
t (|N k|x¯kt − xit) +
∑
l∈K,l 6=k
dk,lt |N l|x¯lt
=: Akt x
i
t +
∑
l∈K
Dk,lt x¯
l
t, (36)
where Akt = a
k
t − dk,kt and Dk,lt = |N l|dk,lt . By a similar
algebra, we can define Bkt and E
k,l
t such that
Bi·t ut = Bkt uit +
∑
l∈K
Ek,lt u¯
l
t, (37)
where Bkt = b
k
t − ek,kt and Ek,lt = |N l|ek,lt . Substituting (36)
and (37) in (35), we get (5). Now consider the per-step cost
given by (3). Note that
xt
ᵀQtxt =
∑
k∈K
∑
l∈K
∑
i∈Nk
∑
j∈N l
(xit)
ᵀ
Qi,jt x
j
t
=
∑
k∈K
∑
l∈K,l 6=k
∑
i∈Nk
∑
j∈N l
(xit)
ᵀ
px,k,lt x
j
t
+
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
∑
j∈Nk,j 6=i
(xit)
ᵀ
px,k,kt x
j
t
+
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
(xit)
ᵀ
qkt x
i
t
=
∑
k∈K
∑
l∈K,l 6=k
|N k||N l|(x¯kt )ᵀpx,k,lt x¯lt
+
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
∑
j∈Nk
|N k|2(x¯kt )ᵀpx,k,kt x¯kt
−
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
(xit)
ᵀ
px,k,kt x
i
t +
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
(xit)
ᵀ
qkt x
i
t
16
=
∑
k∈K
∑
l∈K
|N k||N l|(x¯kt )ᵀpx,k,lt x¯lt
+
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
(xit)
ᵀ
(qkt − px,k,kt )xit
=: xt
ᵀP xt xt +
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
1
|N k| (x
i
t)
ᵀ
Qkt x
i
t, (38)
where P xt
k,l = |N k||N l|px,k,l and Qkt = |N k|(qkt − px,k,kt ).
By similar algebraic manipulation, we can show
ut
ᵀRtut = utᵀPut ut +
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈Nk
1
|N k| (u
i
t)
ᵀ
Rkt u
i
t, (39)
where Put
k,l = |N k||N l|pu,k,l and Rkt = |N k|(rkt − pu,k,kt ).
Substituting (38) and (39) in (3), we get (6).
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